Existential Assertions for Voting Protocols by Ramanujam, R. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
2.
05
00
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
6 F
eb
 20
17
Existential Assertions for Voting Protocols
R. Ramanujam
Institute of Mathematical Sciences
Chennai, India.
jam@imsc.res.in
Vaishnavi Sundararajan
Chennai Mathematical Institute, Chennai, India.
vaishnavi@cmi.ac.in
S.P. Suresh
Chennai Mathematical Institute, Chennai, India.
spsuresh@cmi.ac.in
Abstract
In [22], we extend the Dolev-Yao model with assertions. We build on that work
and add existential abstraction to the language, which allows us to translate common
constructs used in voting protocols into proof properties. We also give an equivalence-
based definition of anonymity in this model, and prove anonymity for the FOO voting
protocol.
1 Anonymity
Formal verification of security protocols often involves the analysis of a property where
the relationship between an agent and a message sent by him/her needs to be kept secret.
This property, called “anonymity”, is a version of the general unlinkability property, and
one of much interest. There can be multiple examples of such anonymity requirements,
including healthcare records, online shopping history, and movie ratings [20]. Electronic
voting protocols are a prime example of a field where ensuring and verifying anonymity is
crucial.
It is interesting to see how protocols are modelled symbolically for the analysis of such
properties. In the Dolev-Yao model [10], one often requires special operators in order to
capture certain behaviour. Many voting schemes employ an operation known as a blind
signature [8]. A blind signature is one where the underlying object can be hidden (via a
blinding factor), the now-hidden object signed, and then the blind removed to have the
signature percolate down to the underlying object. The FOO voting protocol given in [11]
crucially uses blind signatures in order to obtain a signature on an encrypted object. [7] shows
that the derivability problem for protocols involving blind signatures becomes DEXPTIME-
hard. Protocols which do not use blind signatures often use homomorphic encryption or mix
nets, which also make the modelling and verification quite complex [17].
Note that in most common models, terms are the only objects communicated. A “certifi-
cate” of an agent’s validity – which is an intrinsically different object from a term containing
an agent’s vote, for example – is also modelled as a term in the term algebra. [4, 5], for
example, augment the Dolev-Yao term syntax with an extra primitive ZK, which can be used
to create a term that codes up a zero-knowledge proof. However, no direct logical inference
is possible with these proof terms, and therefore, it is difficult to reason about what further
knowledge agents can obtain using them. [22] proposes a departure from this paradigm,
using assertions as a further abstraction that can be used for modelling protocols. Asser-
tions, which code up certificates and have a separate proof system, can be sent by agents
in addition to terms. The assertion algebra allows designers to model protocols involving
certification in a more explicatory manner (by maintaining terms and certificates as separate
objects). It also allows analysts to capture any increase in agents’ knowledge achieved by
deduction at the level of certificates.
So what are these assertions and how do they behave? Assertions include statements
about various terms appearing in the protocol. These include instances of application-
specific predicates and equalities between two different symbolic terms. Assertions can also
be combined using the usual propositional connectives and (∧) and or (∨). They also include
a says operator, which works as an ownership mechanism for assertions, and disallows other
agents from forwarding such an assertion in their own name. Perhaps the most crucial (and
useful) addition to the assertion language here (over the system in [22]) is the existential
quantifier. This allows us to quantify out any term from an assertion, thereby effectively
hiding the actual term about which that assertion is made. Since existential assertions thus
hide the private data used to generate a certificate, while revealing some partial information,
they seem especially useful for capturing blinding (and similar operations with this goal) in
voting protocols.
1.1 Related Work
Research on anonymity has been carried out for many years now. In the applied-pi calculus,
[16] verifies anonymity for the FOO protocol, [2] studies general unlinkability and shows that
this implies anonymity, and [19] provides an applied-pi based model incorporating aspects
of the underlying communication mechanism (anonymous channels in particular).
There are also many epistemic logic-based approaches. [14] provides a logical framework
built on modal epistemic logic for anonymity in multiagent systems; [12, 23] also define
information-hiding properties in terms of agent knowledge; [15] provides a modular frame-
work that allows one to analyze general unlinkability properties using function views, along
with extensive case studies on anonymity and privacy.
Theorem provers have also been used to verify anonymity. [6] uses an automatic theorem
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prover MCMAS for verification; [3] also specifies general unlinkability as an extension to the
Inductive Method for security protocol verification in the theorem prover Isabelle.
In this paper, we extract a logical core of reasoning about certificates, translate the
typical constructs used for voting protocols into proof properties, and employ equivalence-
based reasoning for verifying anonymity. We also apply this technique to model two voting
protocols, namely FOO and Helios, and to analyze anonymity for FOO.
2 Modelling the FOO protocol
2.1 Introduction to FOO
In [11], the authors introduce the FOO protocol for electronic voting, which has inspired
many subsequent protocols. This protocol uses blinding functions and bit commitments in
order to satisfy many desirable security properties, including anonymity. The voter V sends
to the authority A his name, along with a blindsigned commitment to the vote v. The
authority signs this term, and sends it back to V . V now unblinds this to obtain a signature
on his commitment to the vote v, and sends that to the collector C. C adds the encrypted
vote and V ’s commitment to the public bulletin board. V then sends to C the random bit r
he used to create the vote commitment, so C can access the vote and update his tally. The
protocol is presented in Figure 1a (see [11, 16] for a detailed explanation). Sends marked by
# are over anonymous channels.
2.2 Modelling FOO with Assertions
In Figure 1b, we present the FOO protocol as modelled using assertions.
The voter V contacts the authority A with his vote v encrypted using a random key rA.
V also sends a certificate linking his name to his encrypted vote v. The V says prefix links
V to the certificate about v, and thus informs the authority that V wishes to vote using the
valid vote v, the encrypted form of which has been sent with the certificate. Note that this
certificate automatically rules out replay attacks (of the kind where another agent V ′ copies
V ’s published data off the bulletin board and replays it in her own name).
The authority A checks that the voter V has not voted earlier. If this check passes, A
adds the fact that V has voted with the encrypted term {v}rA to her database (so that V
cannot vote again in the future) via an insert action. A then issues a certificate stating that
V is a valid voter and wishes to vote with the encrypted term he sent A earlier, and that V
claims that the term encrypted therein is a valid vote. The voter V now anonymously sends
to the counter C the vote v encrypted in a new random key. This is accompanied by an
existential assertion, which hides the voter’s identity from C, while still convincing C that
A has certified V and the sent vote to be valid.
We need three predicates here – valid, elg, and voted. The first two are predicates
for stating the validity of the vote and the eligibility of the voter, respectively. The voted
predicate is used for linking the voter and the vote. As we shall see in Section 4, we can add
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V → A : V, [blind(commit(v, r), b)]V
A→ V : [blind(commit(v, r), b)]A
V # C : [commit(v, r)]A
C → : list, [commit(v, r)]A
V → C : r
(a) FOO Protocol with terms. [x]A
denotes x signed by A.
V → A : {v}rA , V says { ∃x, r : {x}r = {v}rA
∧ valid(x) }
A : deny ∃x : voted(V, x)
A : insert voted(V, {v}rA)
A→ V : A says
[ elg(V ) ∧ voted(V, {v}rA)
∧ V says { ∃x, r : {x}r = {v}rA
∧ valid(x) } ]
V # C : {v}rC , rC ,
∃X ∃y, s : A says
[ elg(X) ∧ voted(X, {y}s)
∧ X says { ∃x, r : {x}r = {y}s
∧ valid(x) } ]
∧ y = v
(b) FOO Protocol with assertions.
Figure 1: FOO Protocol: Modelling with terms only and with assertions
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such protocol-specific predicates to the assertion language in order to communicate succinct
certificates (for example, here we use valid(v), instead of providing a disjunction over the
finite set of valid votes for the value of v, which would grow longer as the set of allowable
values grows larger).
3 Modelling Helios 2.0
3.1 Introduction to Helios
[1] introduces the voting scheme called Helios which has the desirable property of public
auditability, i.e., even if Helios is fully corrupt, one can verify the integrity of an election
outsourced to it. Helios provides unconditional integrity, while privacy is guaranteed if one
trusts the Helios server, which doubles up as election administrator and trustee. The voter
sends his vote to the Ballot Preparation System, which creates an encrypted ballot, which is
then sealed and cast. The voter’s identity and ballot are then posted on the public bulletin
board. On closing the election, Helios removes voter names, shuffles all ballots, produces a
proof of correct shuffling, and posts these on the board. After allowing some time for auditors
to check the shuffling, Helios decrypts each ballot, produces a proof of correct decryption, and
posts the tally on the bulletin board. Helios crucially uses auditing by various participants
in order to guarantee correctness.
3.2 Helios 2.0
[9] demonstrates an attack on vote privacy in the basic Helios system in [1], where, by
controlling more than half the voters, an adversary can get the compromised voters to copy
a single (honest) voter’s encrypted ballot off the bulletin board, and from the tally know
whom that voter voted for. Note that this happens in spite of the Helios system itself being
non-corrupt. In order to fix this, they introduce measures to weed out replayed ballots,
and a linking mechanism between every ballot and the voter whose vote it is supposed to
encrypt. They also replace the shuffling mechanism by a homomorphic encryption operation,
and introduce trustees who are distinct from the election administrator. This introduces an
extra assurance of vote privacy, since a corrupt administrator needs to corrupt some trustees
in order to see a voter’s unencrypted vote.
3.3 Modelling Helios 2.0 with Assertions
The voter first inputs his vote to a script which creates his ballot and sends it back to him
with an assertion stating correctness. The voter can then choose to cast this vote, at which
point the script submits his ballot and the assertion to the administrator. The administrator
publishes the ballot and the assertion on the bulletin board. After some known deadline,
the administrator homomorphically combines all ballots, and publishes the encrypted tally
5
V → S : v, V says valid(v)
S → V : b, S says {∃v : b = ballot(v) ∧ V says valid(v)}
V → S : cast
S → A : b, S says {∃v : b = ballot(v) ∧ V says valid(v)}
A : deny voted(V )
A : insert voted(V )
A→ BB : b, A says S says {∃v : b = ballot(v) ∧ V says valid(v)}
Suppose b1, . . . , bk were the ballots cast and published on the bulletin board.
A→ BB : t, A says [∃s : t = ballot(s) ∧
{∃v1, . . . , vk : s = sum(v1, . . . , vk) ∧
k∧
i=1
bi = ballot(vi)}]
Figure 2: Helios 2.0 Protocol with assertions
along with an assertion stating correctness of the tally. The trustees can then decrypt this
tally, and the administrator publishes the result.
In Figure 2 we model Helios 2.0 with assertions. We do not include the final step, where
the trustees decrypt the final encrypted tally and publish it onto the bulletin board. Note
that this model, much like the terms-only model in [9], requires us to add a homomorphic
encryption operation to our term algebra. However, we can incorporate the weeding out of
replayed ballots and establishing the link between ballots and voters by the use of assertions
alone, instead of having to send extra terms. Note that in order for an agent V2 to copy V1’s
vote and replay it to A, V2 would need to make an assertion of the form S says {∃v : b =
ballot(v) ∧ V2 says valid(v)}, which would contradict the sending in V1’s name. Thus we
can establish a link between vote and voter, while also disallowing replays. We merely need
to add a homomorphic encryption operation to the term algebra, since our assertions, as of
now, are not capable of capturing this operation.
4 Assertions: Theory
We fix the following countable sets – a set V of variables, a set Ag of agents, a set N of
nonces, and a set of K of keys. We assume that every k ∈ K has an inverse key, denoted
inv(k). The set of basic terms B is defined to be Ag∪N ∪K . The set of terms T is given
by the following syntax:
t := m | (t1, t2) | {t}k
where m ∈ B ∪ V , and k ∈ K ∪ V . A term with no variables occurring in it is called a
ground term.
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ax
X ∪ {t} ⊢ t
X ⊢ t1 X ⊢ t2
pair
X ⊢ (t1, t2)
X ⊢ (t1, t2)
split
X ⊢ ti
X ⊢ t X ⊢ k
enc
X ⊢ {t}k
X ⊢ {t}k X ⊢ inv(k)
dec
X ⊢ t
Table 1: The Dolev-Yao derivation system
The system of rules for deriving new ground terms from old is given in Table 1. The
rules are presented in terms of sequents X ⊢ t where X is a finite set of ground terms, and
t is a ground term.
4.1 Assertions and derivations
We now present the formal details of the model with assertions, a version of which was first
proposed in [22]. The set of assertions, A , is given by the following syntax (fixing a set of
variables, and a set of predicates for each arity):
α := t = t′ | α1 ∨ α2 | α1 ∧ α2 | ∃x : α | m says α
| valid(m) | elg(m) | . . . | m sent t | m sent α
where t ∈ T , m ∈ Ag ∪ V , and valid and elg are application-specific predicates. The
ellipses signify that one may add more such simple predicates, depending on the application
requirements (as in the FOO protocol, from Section 2.2). A ground assertion is one with no
free variables.
The set of assertions is a positive fragment of existential first-order logic. The intention is
that in addition to ground terms, agents also communicate ground assertions to each other.
Agents are allowed to assert equality of terms, and basic predicates on terms, as well as
disjunctions and conjunctions. They can also “sign” assertions by use of the says operator.
They also have the capability of existentially abstracting some terms from an assertion,
thereby modelling witness hiding. The sole use of the sent operator is to enable an observer
to record who communicated a term or an assertion.
In the course of participating in a protocol, agents accumulate a database of ground terms
and ground assertions communicated to them. The proof system for assertions is presented
in Table 2. The rules are presented in terms of sequents X,Φ ⊢ α, where X is a finite set of
ground terms and Φ is a finite set of assertions (which are not necessarily ground).
Equality assertions form a central part of communications between agents. Note that an
agent A can derive t = t only when all basic subterms of t can be derived by A. The recipient
of an equality assertion can use the rules provided in Table 2 to reason further about the
terms involved therein. Our rules for equality are fairly intuitive and reflect basic properties
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X ⊢dy m
[m ∈ B ∪ V ]
X,Φ ⊢ m = m
ax
X,Φ ∪ {α} ⊢ α
X,Φ ⊢ α(t) X,Φ ⊢ t = t′
X,Φ ⊢ α(t′)
X,Φ ⊢ s = t X,Φ ⊢ t = u
X,Φ ⊢ s = u
X,Φ ⊢ s = t
X,Φ ⊢ t = s
X,Φ ⊢ (s0, s1) = (t0, t1)
X,Φ ⊢ si = ti
X,Φ ⊢ s = s′ X,Φ ⊢ t = t′
X,Φ ⊢ (s, t) = (s′, t′)
X,Φ ⊢ {s0}s1 = {t0}t1
•
X,Φ ⊢ si = ti
X,Φ ⊢ s = s′ X,Φ ⊢ m = m′
X,Φ ⊢ {s}m = {s
′}m′
X,Φ ⊢ m = n
⊥ [m,n ∈ B, m 6= n]
X,Φ ⊢ α
X,Φ ⊢ α X ⊢dy sk(A)
saysA
X,Φ ⊢ A says α
X,Φ ⊢ α X,Φ ⊢ β
∧i
X,Φ ⊢ α ∧ β
X,Φ ⊢ α1 ∧ α2
∧e
X,Φ ⊢ αi
X,Φ ⊢ A says α
strip
X,Φ ⊢ α
X,Φ ⊢ αi
∨i
X,Φ ⊢ α1 ∨ α2
X,Φ ⊢ α ∨ β X,Φ ∪ {α} ⊢ δ X,Φ ∪ {β} ⊢ δ
∨e
X,Φ ⊢ δ
X,Φ ⊢ α(t)
∃i
X,Φ ⊢ ∃x : α(x)
X,Φ ⊢ ∃x : α(x) X,Φ ∪ {α(y)} ⊢ β
∃e
X,Φ ⊢ β
Table 2: Derivation rules for assertions. We assume that X ⊢dy x for all variables x, and
that inv(x) = x. In the • rule, we require that X ⊢dy inv(s1) and X ⊢dy inv(t1). In the ∃e
rule, we require that y 6∈ Vars(X,Φ ∪ {β}).
of the pairing and encryption operations. Equality assertions are most likely to be used in
existentially quantified assertions. Notable among the other rules are saysA, which allows
the possessor of sk(A) to “sign” an assertion in A’s name, and strip, which allows one to
strip the sign in A says α and use α in local reasoning.
These rules allow agents to carry out non-trivial inferences, potentially learning more
than was intended by the protocol. Suppose an agent A has a term {v}k, which he knows be
a nonce encrypted with some key, but whose inverse he does not have access to. One would
presume that A therefore should have no idea about the value of v. However, it is possible
for assertions about {v}k to reveal more information to A. Suppose A manages to obtain two
certificates ∃x, y : {v}k = {x}y ∧ (x = 0∨ x = 1) and ∃x, y : {v}k = {x}y ∧ (x = 0∨ x = 2).
Let us call these assertions ∃x, y : α(x, y) and ∃x, y : α′(x, y). These two assertions are in A’s
database of assertions Φ. Let a, b, a′, b′ be new variables that do not occur in Φ. Consider
Φ ∪ {α(a, b), α′(a′, b′)}. From {v}k = {a}b and {v}k = {a
′}b′ , we get {a}b = {a
′}b′, and
hence a = a′ and b = b′. From the other parts of α and α′, and using transitivity, we get
a = 0 ∨ a = 1 and a = 0 ∨ a = 2. We use disjunction elimination to get a = 0. From
this we conclude that {v}k = {0}b, and hence Φ ∪ {α(a, b), α
′(a′, b′)} ⊢ ∃y : ({v}k = {0}y).
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Therefore, using the ∃e rule, we get Φ ⊢ ∃y : ({v}k = {0}y).
In the formal model of [4, 5], each zkp term proves a formula involving some private
and some public variables. The recipient of a zkp term is deemed to have knowledge of the
terms used in place of the public variables, but not the private ones. We adopt a similar
convention. For an assertion α, if an equality of the form t = t′ occurs in it, or if α involves
the application of a predicate to a term t, then α reveals t. However, if a term of the form
{v}k, say, appears in α, then α does not reveal v. We also adopt the convention that every
term revealed by an assertion is sent earlier in the protocol.
4.2 Actions, roles and protocols
There are six type of actions – send, anonymous send, receive, confirm, deny, and insert.
Sends, anonymous sends, and receives are of the form +A: (~m)(t, α), +A∗ : (~m)(t, α) and
−A: (t, α) respectively, where A ∈ Ag ∪ {id} (where id is a dedicated variable that stands
for the agent performing the action), ~m ⊆ V ∪N ∪K stands for nonces and keys that are
fresh which should be instantiated with hitherto unused values in each occurrence of this
action, t ∈ T and α ∈ A . The A: confirm α and A: deny α actions allow A to branch on
whether or not he can derive α, while A: insert α allows A to add previously unknown true
assertions into her database. For A ∈ Ag ∪ {id}, an A-action is an action which involves A.
A ground action is one without any variable occurrence. An A-role is a finite sequence of
A-actions. A role is an A-role for some A ∈ Ag ∪ {id}. A protocol Pr is a finite set of roles.
Given a sequence of actions η = a1 · · · an, we say that the variable x originates at i if x
occurs in ai and does not occur in aj for any j < i. A variable x occurring in a role η is said
to be bound if it originates at i and either ai is a receive action, or ai = +A: (~y)(t, α) is a
send action with x ∈ ~y.
As an example, we show the voter role for the FOO protocol from Section 2. In this role,
v and id stand for the vote and voter respectively, while k, k′ are fresh keys, and auth is a
bound variable (since it originates in a receive) which stands for the authority with whom
the voter interacts.
+id : (k) {v}k, id says {∃x, r : {x}r = {v}k ∧ valid(x)}
−id : auth says [elg(id) ∧ voted(id, {v}k)
∧ id says { ∃x, r : {x}r = {v}k ∧ valid(x) } ]
+id∗ : (k′) ({v}k′, k
′),
∃X, y, s : auth says [elg(X) ∧ voted(X, {y}s)
∧ X says {∃x, r : {x}r = {y}s ∧ valid(x)}] ∧ y = v
The authority and counter roles can also be extracted from the protocol description in a
similar manner.
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4.3 Runs of a protocol
Even though the roles of a protocol mention variables, its runs (or executions) consist only
of ground terms and assertions exchanged in various instances of the roles. An instance of
a role is formally specified by a substitution σ, which is a partial map from V to the set of
all ground terms. We lift σ for terms, assertions and actions in the standard manner. σ is
said to be suitable for an action a if σ(a) is an action, i.e. a typing discipline is followed. A
substitution is suitable for a role η if it is defined on all free variables of η and suitable for
all actions in η.
A session of a protocol Pr is a sequence of actions of the form σ(η), where η ∈ Pr and σ
is suitable for η.
A run of a protocol is an interleaving of sessions in which each agent can construct the
messages that it communicates. This is formalized by a notion of knowledge state, which
represents all the terms and assertions that each agent knows. A control state is a record of
progress made by an agent in the various sessions he/she participates in.
A knowledge state ks is a tuple ((XA,ΦA)A∈Ag), where XA (resp. ΦA) is the set of ground
terms (resp. ground assertions) belonging to an agent A. A control state S is a finite set of
sequences of actions. A protocol state is a pair (ks, S) where ks is a knowledge state and S
is a control state.
Definition 1. Let (ks, S) and (ks′, S ′) be two states of a protocol Pr, and let b be a ground
action. We say that (ks, S)
b
−→ (ks′, S ′) iff there is a session η = a · η′ ∈ S and a substitution
σ suitable for η′ such that:
• b = σ(a)
• S ′ = (S \ {η}) ∪ {σ(η′)}
• ks
b
−→ ks′ as given in Table 3.
In Definition 1, we add σ(η′) rather than η′, in order to update the substitution associated
with the session on executing the action. This update reflects the new values generated for
each fresh nonce variable (in case the action is a send) or the new bindings for input variables
(in case the action is a receive). For instance, if η = a ·η′ where a = −A: ((x, y), α(x, y)) and
b = −A: ((t, t′), α(t, t′)), then σ = [x := t, y := t′]. Any occurrence of x in η′ is bound to t.
Note the crucial difference between the updates for sends and anonymous sends – in the
former, the intruder updates its state with A sent t and A sent α, whereas in the latter, no
sender information is available to any observer (including the intruder).
An initial control state of Pr is a finite set of sessions of Pr. In the initial knowledge
state, each agent has her own secret keys and shared keys, all public keys in her database,
and potentially some constants of Pr.
Definition 2. A run of a protocol Pr is (ks0, a1 · · · an) such that ks0 is an initial knowledge
state, and there exist sequences ks1, . . . , ksn and S0, . . . , Sn such that (ksi−1, Si−1)
ai−→ (ksi, Si)
for all i ≤ n.
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Action b Enabling conditions Updates
+A: (~m)(t, α)
XA ∪ ~m ⊢ t X
′
A = XA ∪ ~m X
′
I = XI ∪ {t}
XA ∪ ~m,ΦA ⊢ α Φ
′
I = ΦI ∪ {α,A sent t, A sent α}
+A∗: (~m)(t, α)
XA ∪ ~m ⊢ t X
′
A = XA ∪ ~m X
′
I = XI ∪ {t}
XA ∪ ~m,ΦA ⊢ α Φ
′
I = ΦI ∪ {α}
−A: (t, α)
XI ⊢ t X
′
A = XA ∪ {t}
XI ,ΦI ⊢ α Φ
′
A = ΦA ∪ {α}
A: confirm α XA,ΦA ⊢ α No change
A: deny α XA,ΦA 0 α No change
A: insert α Always enabled Φ′A = ΦA ∪ {α}
Table 3: Enabling conditions for ks
b
−→ ks′. We assume that for each agent A, (XA,ΦA) and
(X ′A,Φ
′
A) represent A’s knowledge in ks and ks
′, respectively.
4.4 Notes on implementability
A central aspect of this model is that communicated assertions are “believed” by the re-
cipients. This is reflected in the updates for receive actions. On the other hand, it is not
possible for a malicious agent to inject “falsehoods” into the system, as evidenced by the
enabling conditions which only allow derivable assertions to be communicated. How might
all this be realized in practice?
An implementation is to demand that every communicated assertion be translated into
an appropriate zero knowledge proof. But suppose an agent receives ZKPs for assertions α
and β from A and B, and wishes to send α∧β to someone else. For this, she should have the
capacity to produce a ZKP for α ∧ β. This implements the ∧i rule in our system. Clearly
this requires some mechanism for composing ZKPs. Such a system has been studied in [18],
which proposes a logical language close to ours, and also discusses modular construction of
ZKPs, based on the seminal work on composability of ZKPs [13].
However, [18] has some restrictions on the proof rules for which one can modularly
construct ZKPs. For instance, they do not consider disjunction elimination or existential
elimination. Nevertheless, we consider these rules since they are at the heart of potential
attacks (as illustrated by the earlier example). This situation can be handled formally by
making a distinction between rules that are “safe for composition” and rules that are not.
A rule like ∧i is safe for composition, for example, whereas ∨e might not be. We then adopt
the restriction that we communicate assertions that are derived using only safe rules. If the
derivation of an assertion necessarily involves unsafe rules, then it cannot be communicated
to another agent, even though this derivation itself is allowed for local reasoning. In this
paper, we therefore consider both local reasoning to derive more assertions (to gain more
knowledge about some secrets, for instance) as well as deriving communicable assertions.
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5 Formalizing anonymity
Informally, we say that a voting protocol satisfies anonymity if in all executions of the
protocol, no adversary can deduce the connection between a voter and her vote. One way
to formalise it is to consider a run ρ where voter V0 voted 0 and voter V1 voted 1, and show
that there is some run ρ′ where the votes of V0 and V1 are swapped and every other voter
acts the same as in ρ, such that even the most powerful intruder I (who has access to all
keys of the authorities) cannot distinguish ρ from ρ′.
Definition 3. Let (ks, ρ) and (ks′, ρ′) be two runs of Pr, where ρ = a1 · · · an and ρ
′ = a′
1
· · · a′n.
Let ti and t
′
i be the terms communicated in ai and a
′
i, respectively. Let (X,Φ) and (X
′,Φ′)
be the knowledge states of I at the end of each run.
We say that (ks, ρ) is I-indistinguishable from (ks′, ρ′) – denoted (ks, ρ) ∼I (ks
′, ρ′) – if
for all assertions α(x1, . . . , xk) and all sequences i1 < · · · < ik ≤ n:
X,Φ ⊢ α(ti1 , . . . , tik) iff X
′,Φ′ ⊢ α(t′i1 , . . . , t
′
ik
).
One can view the parameters x1, . . . , xk occurring in the above definition as handles, and
the mapping from x1, . . . , xk to ti1 , . . . , tik as an active substitution. Parametrized assertions
α(x1, . . . , xk) constitute tests on each run of the protocol. Thus the above notion is related
to the notion of static equivalence that is central to protocol modelling in the applied-pi
calculus [4, 5, 16]. Note that the notion of indistinguishability we use here is trace-based,
as that fits naturally with our model. But it is also possible to have a bisimulation-based
definition, and adapt our proof ideas.
Consider a voting protocol Pr with three roles – voter, authority and counter, and two
phases: authorization and voting. For simplicity, we assume that there are two fixed agents
A and C who play the authority and counter role, respectively. If there is only one voter
in a run, then obviously his/her vote can be linked to him/her. If a voter’s vote is counted
during the authorization phase, then we might have a situation where a vote is cast by a
voter before anyone else has been authorized. This again is an easy violation of anonymity.
Therefore we assume that in any run of Pr, there are at least two agents playing the voter
role, and all Vi → A actions precede all Vj → C actions.
Fix voter names V0, V1, and votes v0 and v1. A session η of Pr is said to be an (i, j)-session
if η maps id to Vi and v to vj .
Definition 4. We say that Pr satisfies anonymity if for every initial knowledge state ks =
(X,Φ) such that XA ∪ XC ⊆ XI , and for every run (ks, ρ) which includes a (0, 0)-session
and a (1, 1)-session, there is a run (ks, ρ′) which includes a (1, 0)-session and a (0, 1)-session
such that (ks, ρ) ∼I (ks, ρ
′).
Theorem 5. The FOO protocol satisfies anonymity.
Proof. Recall the voter role for FOO from Section 4.2. Consider a run (ks, ρ) of FOO whose
initial control state is S ∪ {η0, η1}, where η0 is the (0, 0)-session and η1 is the (1, 1)-session.
Let η2 and η3 be the (0, 1)-session and (1, 0)-session, respectively. We construct a run ρ
′
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which includes η2 and η3 such that (ks, ρ) ∼I (ks, ρ
′). The session η0 assigns values p and r
to the keys k and k′ from the role description, while η1 assigns values q and s respectively.
For ease of notation, we denote v0 and v1 by u and v respectively, and d = {u}p and e = {v}q.
Suppose ρ = a1 · · ·an. Assume without loss of generality that both sessions η0 and η1 are
fully played out in ρ. Also without loss of generality, let i < j < k < l be indices such that
the send actions of η0 are ai and ak, and the send actions of η1 are aj and al, where
ai = +V0: (p)(d, β(d)) and ak = +V
∗
0
: (r)(({u}r, r), γ(u))
aj = +V1: (q)(e, β(e)) and al = +V
∗
1
: (s)(({v}s, s), γ(v))
We build ρ′ = b1 · · · bn as shown in Figure 3.
ρ a1 . ai . . aj . . ak . . al . an
ρ′ b1 . bi . . bj . . bk . . bl . bn
. . . . . .
Figure 3: Building ρ′ from ρ. The dashed arrows capture bm = am[d 7→ e, e 7→ d], for all
m 6∈ {l, k}. For m ∈ {l, k}, the thick arrows stand for bm = am[V0 7→ V1, V1 7→ V0].
Observe that ρ′ is also a run of FOO starting from the state (ks, S ∪ {η2, η3}), where η2
contains bi and bl, and η3 contains bj and bk. We crucially use the fact that we do not fix
the instances of the fresh nonces a priori, so we can swap the action containing p as a fresh
nonce with the one containing q as a fresh nonce, for example.
For any term t (resp. assertion α), we define swp(t) (resp. swp(α)) to be the result of
changing all occurrences of d to e and vice versa. swp is lifted to sets of terms and assertions
as usual.
Let (X,Φ) and (X ′,Φ′) be the knowledge states of I at the end of ρ and ρ′ respectively.
It is evident from the construction of ρ′ that X ′ = swp(X). Furthermore, it is easy to see
that neither X nor X ′ derive either p or q, and that X ⊢dy t iff X
′ ⊢dy swp(t).
It can also be seen that Φ′ = swp(Φ), as elaborated below. For every m, if am communi-
cates α, then bm communicates swp(α). The other formulas added to Φ are sent assertions.
For every action am other than ak and al, the sender of bm is unchanged from am. Therefore,
a sent assertion with the same sender name would be added to Φ and Φ′. For ak and al, no
sent assertions are added since these are anonymous sends. Therefore, Φ′ = swp(Φ).
We now prove that X,Φ ⊢ α(ti1, . . . , tik) iff X
′,Φ′ ⊢ α(t′i1, . . . , t
′
ik
), for all assertions
α(x1, . . . , xk). It suffices to prove that X,Φ ⊢ α iff X
′,Φ′ ⊢ swp(α) for all α. For every ∃ : δ,
let yδ be a variable that does not occur in Φ. A set Θ is said to be closed under witnesses
if δ(yδ) ∈ Θ for all ∃y : δ ∈ Θ. Let Π be the smallest superset of Φ closed under witnesses.
We use Π′ to denote swp(Π). It can be shown by an analysis of derivations that X,Φ ⊢ α
iff X,Π ⊢1 α and X
′,Φ′ ⊢ α iff X ′,Π′ ⊢1 α, where ⊢1 denotes derivability without using the
∃e rule. Note that both X,Π and X ′,Π′ are safe for d and e in the following sense. They
do not derive equalities of the form p = t or q = t for any term t, and they do not derive
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equalities of the form d = t′ or e = t′ where t′ is a term containing a non-variable. We now
prove the final claim needed for indistinguishability of ρ and ρ′.
Claim. For any α, X,Π ⊢1 α iff X
′,Π′ ⊢1 swp(α).
Proof of Claim We prove the implication from left to right, by induction on structure of
derivations. The other direction holds by symmetry. Suppose π is a derivation of X,Π ⊢ α,
with last rule r.
r = ax: Suppose α ∈ Π. It follows that swp(α) ∈ Π′.
r is equality of encrypted terms: π looks as follows.
π0
·
·
·
X,Π ⊢ s = s′
π1
·
·
·
X,Π ⊢ m = m′
X,Π ⊢ {s}m = {s
′}m′
Suppose {s}m is either d or e. Then m is either p or q, and this would mean that
p = m′ or q = m′ is derivable, contradicting safety of X,Π. Therefore {s}m is not
equal to either d or e. By induction hypothesis, swp(s = s′) is derivable from X ′,Π′,
and hence swp({s}m = {s
′}m′) is also derivable.
r is equality of decrypted terms: In this case, π is of the following form
π0
·
·
·
X,Π ⊢ {s}m = {s
′}m′
π1
·
·
·
X ⊢dy inv(m)
π2
·
·
·
X ⊢dy inv(m
′)
X,Π ⊢ s = s′
By induction hypothesis, it follows that X ′,Π′ ⊢ swp({s}m) = swp({s
′}m′). Observe
that neither {s}m nor {s
′}m′ is the same as d or e (for otherwise we would have
that X ⊢dy p or X ⊢dy q, which is an impossibility). Thus any occurrence of d or
e in {s}m is inside s, and similarly for {s
′}m′. Thus swp({s}m) = {swp(s)}m and
swp({s′}m′) = {swp(s
′)}m′ . Therefore swp(s) = swp(s
′) is also derivable. (inv(m) and
inv(m′) are derivable from X ′ since they are derivable from X and do not mention d
or e.)
The rest of the cases are on similar lines (or simpler, appealing to the induction hypothesis).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we extended the model of [22] by adding exisential assertions to the language,
as a tool to hide private data used to generate certificates. These assertions are especially
useful in coding up constructs that are common to voting protocols. We showed how to
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specify protocols in this model, and formalised the notion of anonymity in terms of indistin-
guishability. In a non-trivial example of analysis in our model, we proved anonymity for the
FOO protocol.
One way of extending this model is by adding a background theory of universally quanti-
fied sentences. Such a theory is a standard part of many authorization systems. For instance,
if an agent A communicates to B the assertion ∃x : voted(V, x) and if the background theory
contains the assertion
∀X, x : {voted(X, x)⇒ elg(X)}
then B can conclude elg(V ). More detailed examples are found in [4, 18]. It is an important
ingredient in many systems, and we can easily incorporate it in our theoretical model.
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